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CASE COMMENTS
The argument for an exception in Bethea,23 however, is clouded
by the precise factual situation. The illicit relationship of the parties
could be interpreted as having precipitated the assault, and it appears
that the court justly deprived the defendant of any privilege of
standing his ground. The privilege of standing one's ground should
be reserved for those situations in which the assaulted party is in
no way tainted with fault. Where the situation arises because of an
improper relationship between the parties, the rule in regard to re-
treat by parties at fault rather than parties not at fault should be
applied.
RICHARD J.' TAVSS
REAL ESTATE TAXATION OF FRATERNITIES
AND FACULTY HOUSES
The question of whether real property of tax-exempt educational
institutions used for fraternity houses and faculty residences should
be exempt from taxation involves the interpretation of state constitu-
tional and statutory provisions. Exemptions of colleges from taxation,
like all exemptions, should be strictly construed. At the same time,
public policy dictates that every possible benefit be afforded to edu-
cational institutions.' Generally, it appears that college-owned prop-
erty is more often exempt than subject to real property taxation. 2
The recent case of Denison University v. Board of Tax Appealss
involved a question of tax exemption of fraternity houses constructed
on land owned in fee simple by the University and leased to the fra-
ternities. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that they were not "used
exclusively for charitable purposes" within the purview of the tax
exemption statute4 and so were subject to taxation. The court found
that members elected officers and socialized within the confines of
their residences; and did not find persuasive the argument that the
23Ibid.
1 Webb Academy v. City of Grand Rapids, 209 Mich. 523, 177 N.W. 290, 295
(1920); State v. Carelton College, 154 Minn. 280, 191 N.W. 400 (1923); Syracuse
Univ. v. Murphy, io App. Div. 2d 468, 200 N.Y.S.2d 807 (196o).
2County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 2o3 Va. 6i 3 , 125
S.E.2d 812 (1962). Note private schools do not need to duplicate programs of pub-
lic schools in order to gain tax exemption, but the course of study needs to fit only
the general scheme of tax supported schools. Illinois College of Optometry v.
Lorenz, 21 Ill. App. 2d 219, 171 N.E.2d 620 (1961).
1173 Ohio St. 429, 183 N.E.2d 773 (1962).
4Ohio Rev. Code tit. 57 § 570907 (1958).
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fraternities provided essential dormitory and restaurant facilities.5 Gen-
erally, the Denison case is in accord with Ohio precedents involving
tax exemption of charitable institutions.6
The courts in Ohio, as elsewhere, have not drawn any distinction
between the tax-exempt status of fraternity and faculty houses. Den-
ison University in the principal case relied heavily on the 19o9 case
of Kenyon College v. Schnebly,7 in which the court upheld exemption
of professors' houses on campus from taxation. However, the court
found the decision not to be controlling since there had been a later
constitutional change in Ohio. The tax exemption clause of the
Constitution had been changed from "all public colleges, public
academies, all buildings connected with the same and all lands con-
nected with public institutions of learning not used with a view to-
ward profit"s to "real... property belonging to the institutions that
is used exclusively for charitable purposes shall be exempt from tax-
ation."D The present Constitution bases tax exemption on the usage
to which the property is put rather than its status of being owned
by a nonprofit institution.' 0
Generally, state constitutions and statutory provisions regarding the
exemption of fraternities and faculty housing from real property
taxation fall into three classifications: (1)States requiring the proper-
ty to be used "exclusively" for educational purposes in order to
qualify for tax exemption; (2) States only requiring the property to
be used "primarily" for educational purposes to so qualify; and (3)
States with provisions not using either adverb, arid so subject to a con-
siderable range of judicial construction.
States requiring the property to be used "exclusively" for edu-
cational purposes" in turn tend to fall into two groups. The majority
$173 Ohio St. 429, 183 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1962).
ONote, 1 W. Rec. L. Rev. 151 (1949); Note, 2o Cinn. L. Rev. 266 (1951). The
Ohio legislature attempted, by amendment, to grant exemption to all property
used by charitable institutions for income purposes. Ohio. Gen Code Ann. §
5353 1 (Page, 1937). The law was held unconstitutional. New Orphans' Asylum
of Colored Children of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax Appeals, 15o Ohio St. 219,
8o N.E.2d 761 (1948).
112 Ohio C.C.R. (Ns.) 1 (Cir. Ct. 19o9) , af'd, 81 Ohio St. 514, 91 N.E. 1138
(1909).
8Ohio Const. art. 12, § 2 (1851), Ohio Rev. Stat. § 2732 (Bates, 19o4).
9Ohio Const. art. 12 § 2 (191i2), Ohio Rev. Code tit. 57, § 5709.07 (1962).
"OWehrle Foundation v. Evatt, 141 Ohio St. 467, 49 N.E.2d 52 (1943); Jones v.
Conn., 116 Ohio St. 1, 155 N.E. 791 (1927); Benjamin Rose Institute v. Meyers, 92
Ohio St. 252, 11o N.E. 924 (1915).
"Ala. Code tit. 51, § 2(a) (1958); Ark. Const. art. 16, § 5; Cal. Const. art. 1s,
§ 1 (a); Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 12-81(7) (1958); Ill. Const. art. 9, § 3; Kan. Const.
art. ii, § i; Mich. Stat. Ann. § 7.7 (Henderson, 194o); Miss. Code Ann. § 9 69 7(d)
1963] CASE COMMENTS
view requires that the property be used solely and for no other pur-
pose than that of education.12 The minority extends exemption to
all property used for education, is not limited to buildings used only
for educational purposes in a strict or literal sense.
Under the majority view, of which Ohio is typical, the words are
construed literally, and so these states are strict in granting the tax
exemptions to both fraternities13 and faculty houses.14 Fraternities
are considered to be for the use and enjoyment of their members,
while their educational, charitable, and benevolent purposes are of
secondary importance.'5 Faculty housing on campus provides an ele-
ment of convenience to the professors, any educational or benevolent
purpose again being of a secondary nature.16 Construing the word
"exclusively" literally, Ohio has denied tax exemption to the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati for vacant lots owned by the University, since
no income from these lots was used for the endowment or support of
the University.' 7 Similarly, Ohio denied tax exemption to Western
Reserve Academy for residences on campus belonging to the school,
(1952); Mo. Const. art. io, § 6; Neb. Const. art. 8 § 2; N.Y. Tax Law § 4, subd.
6(k); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-296(4) (1958); Ohio Const. art. 12, § 2, Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 5709.07 (Baldwin, 1958); Ore Const. art. 18, § 7, Ore. Rev. Statute. § 307.130
(1958); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 44-3-3(8) (1956); Tenn. Const. art. 2, § 28; Tex. Const.
art. 8 § 2; Wis. Stat. § 70.11(4) (Supp. 1961) [exempts fraternities specifically].
"Annot. 66 A.L.R.2d 904 (1959).
"Knox College v. Board of Review, 308 Ill 16o, 139 N.E. 56, (1923); Theta Xi
Bldg. Ass'n v. Board of Review, 217 Iowa 1181, 251 N.W. 76 (1933); Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity v. Board of County Comm'rs, 136 Kan. 675, 18 P.2d 573 (1933);
Beta Xi Chapter of Beta Theta Pi v. City of New Orleans, i8 La. App. 130, 137
So. 204 (1931); Orno v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Soc'y, io5 Me. 214, 74 At. 19 (19o9);
Phi Beta Epsilon Corp. v. City of Boston, 182 Mass. 457, 65 N.E. 824 (1903); Iota
Benefit Ass'n v. County of Douglas, 165 Neb. 33o, 85 N.V.2d 726 (1957); Rutgers
Chapter Delta Upsilon Fraternity v. City of New Brunswick, 129 N.J.L. 238, 28
A.2d 759, aff'd, 13o N.JJ. 216, 32 A.2d 364 (1942); Albuquerque Alumni Ass'n
v. Tierney, 37 N.M. 156, 20 P.2d 267 (1933); People ex rel. Delta Kappa Epsilon
Soc'y v. Lawler, 74 App. Div. 533, 77 N.Y.S. 84o, afi'd, 179 N.Y. 535, 71 N.E. 1136
(1902); Kappa Gamma Rho v. Marion County, 13o Ore. 165, 279 Pac. 555 (1929);
Powers v. Harvey, 81 RJ.I. 378, 103 A.2d 551 (1954); Re South Dakota Sigma Chapter
House Ass'n, 65 S.D. 559, 276 N.W. 258 (1937).
'"Plattsburgh State Teachers College Benevolent and Educ. Ass'n v. Bernard,
9 Misc. 897, 17o N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958); City of Hoboken v. Division of Tax
Appeals, 136 N.J.L. 328, 55 A.2d 290 (1947); Western Reserve Academy v. Board of
Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91 N.E.2d 497 (195o).
"Orno v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Soc'y, 105 Me. 214, 74 Atl. 19 (19o9); Phi Beta
Epsilon Corp. v. Boston, 182 Mass. 457, 65 N.E. 824 (1903); People ex rel. Delta
Kappa Epsilon Soc'y v. Lawler, 74 App. Div. 553, 77 N.Y.S. 840 (1902).
'ONVestern Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91
N.E.2d 947 (ig5o.)
ITUniversity of Cincinnati v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 142, 91
N.E.2d 5o2 (1950).
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in which certain members of the faculty were required to live for
the purpose of entertaining students and their parents.' s
Under the minority view, of which Illinois is typical, the word
exclusively" is construed liberally, and so these states are more
lenient in granting tax exemptions.19 These courts only require that
the occupancy by the instructor or the Greek letter fraternity further
the purpose for which the college was organized.20 In City of Chicago
v. University of Chicago, Illinois granted tax exemption to a social,
club, in which members paid dues.21 Even though the club existed
for the social benefit of the students living there, its uses were con-
sidered important in carrying out the educational purposes of the
University. The Supreme Court of Illinois thought the dormitory
and restaurant purposes were sufficient educational objective to ac-
cord tax-exempt status. Construing the word "exclusively" loosely,
Illinois granted tax-exemption to the University of Illinois Founda-
tion for buildings which afforded recreational facilities to the students,
notwithstanding a charge was made for room rent, meals, and other
services; 22 and to St. Xavier Female Academy for property used as a
"Western Reserve Academy v. Board of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 133, 91
N.E.2d 497 (1950). For a contrary view in regard to faculty houses, see Kansas Wes-
leyan Univ. v. Salina County Bd. of Comm'rs. 12o Kan. 496, 243 Pac. 1955 (1926);
Trustees of Rutgers College v. Piscataway Thwnship, 2o NJ. Misc. 127, 25 A.2d
248 (1942); People ex rel. Clarkson Memorial College of Technology v. Haggett,
274 App. Div. 732, 734, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491, 493 (1949), aft'd, 300 N.Y. 595, 89 N.E.2d
882 (1949).
"9Bishop of the Cathedral of St. John the Evangelist v. Arapahoe County, 29
Colo. 143, 68 Pac. 272 (igoi); Yale Univ. v. Town of New Haven, 71 Conn. 316,
42 At. 87 (1899); Trustees of Griswold College v. State, 46 Iowa 275 (1877); Kan-
sas Wesleyan Univ. v. Salina County Bd. of Comm'rs, 12o Kan. 496, 243 Pac. 1055
(1926); Webb Academy v. Grand Rapids, 209 Mich. 523, 177 N.W. 290 (1920); State
ex rel. Spillers v. Johnston, 214 Mo. 656, 113 S.W. 1o83 (19o8); Watson v. Cowles,
61 Neb. 216, 85 N.W. 35 (190); City of Hoboken v. Division of Tax Appeals,
134 N.J.L. 594, 49 A.2d 587 (1942); People ex rel. Clarkson Memorial College of
Technology v. Haggett, 274 App. Div. 732, 87 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1949), aff'd 3oo N.Y.
595, 89 N.E.2d 882 (1950); Nashville v. Ward Belmont School, 7 Tenn. App. 6so
(1928); Red v. Morris, 72 Tex. 554, 10 S. W. 681 (1889). Contra, Amos v. Jackson-
ville Realty & Mortgage Co., 77 Fla. 403, 81 So. 524 (1919).
"Church Divinity School of Pacific v. County of Alameda, 152 Cal. App. 2d 496,
314 P.2d 209 (Dist. Ct. App. '957); People ex rel. Gill v. Trustees of Schools, 364 Ill.
131 , 4 N.E.2d 16 (1936); Multnomah School of the Bible v. Multnomah County, 218
Ore. 19, 343 P.2d 893 (1959).
n 2 2 8 111. 6o5, 81 N.E. 1138 (19o7). See also Western Theological Seminary v.
City of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156 N.E. 778 (1927); Monticello Female Seminary v.
People, 106 Ill. 398 (1883).
"People ex rel. Goodman v. University of llinois, 388 Ill. 363, 58 N.E.2d 33
(1944).
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playground.23 The Illinois court also considered a lake used for
swimming at Catholic Bishop of Chicago Seminary to be tax exempt.
24
A few states, 25 of which Virginia is typical, only require that the
property be used "primarily" for educational purposes to qualify for
tax exemption. The Virginia Constitution provides that exemption
from taxation "shall apply to property primarily used for literary,
scientific or educational purposes or purposes incidental thereto." 26
In the recent case of County of Hanover v. Trustees of Randolph-
Macon College,2 7 the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled
that faculty houses owned by the college were exempt; requiring only
that the property be primarily used for educational purposes, rather
than exclusively. The court declared that the dominant purpose of
making land available to members of the faculty was to anchor them
to the college and thereby promote efficient administration and edu-
cational processes. The heart of all colleges is, according to the court,
its faculty; and the provision of housing is essential to obtain a repre-
sentative faculty.
28
The third group of states, 29 of which Pennsylvania is typical, do
not have express constitutional or statutory provisions as to whether
educational property, in order to qualify for tax exemption, must be
used "exclusively" or "primarily" for educational purposes. In at
least one state, Florida, insofar as fraternities are concerned, the matter
is put at rest by an express statutory provision exempting them from
taxation.30 Pennsylvania grants exemption to "all school property
owned by any school district, real and personal, that is occupied and
'People ex rel. Thompson v. St. Francis Xavier Female Academy, 233 IIl.
26, 84 N.E. 55 (19o8). See also Emerson v. Trustees of Milton Academy, 185 Mass.
414, 70 N.E. 442 (19o4); Webb Academy v. City of Grand Rapids, 209 Mich. 523,
177 N.W. 290 (1920); People ex rel. Missionary Sisters v. Reilly, 85 App. Div. 71,
83 N.Y.S. 3o (1903).
2 People ex rel. Pearsall v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 311 Il. 11, 142 N.E.
520 (1924).
'Va. Const. § 183; W. Va. Code ch. 11, art. 3, § 9.
EVa. Const. § 183. See also Commonwealth v. Trustees of Hampton Institute,
io6 Va. 614, 56 S.E. 594 (19o7) and Commonwealth ex rel. Moore v. Smallwood Mem-
morial Institute, 124 Va. 142, 97 S.E. 8o5 (1919).
"-o3 Va. 613, 125 S.E.2d 812 (1962).
2'Id. at 815.
2 Ariz. Const. art. 9, § 2; Del. Const. art. 1o § 4; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 192.o6(8)
(1958) [exempts fraternities specifically]; Ga. Const. art. 7, § 2 2(2); Ind. Const.
art. io, § i; Iowa Code § 427.1(11) (1954); Md. Ann. Code art. 81, § 9(8) (1957);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 59 § 5 (1953); N.H. Laws tit. 9, ch. 73, § 24 (1942); N.J. Rev.
Stat. § 54: 4-3.6 (196o); N.M. Const. art. 8, § 3; Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 550 (1951); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 24, § 7-776 (1962); S.C. Const. art. 1o, § 4.
3'Fla. Stat. Ann. § 192.06 (1958).
